Application of basic principles revolving around the constitutionalism into third wave democracies, produced such phenomenon as constitutions "without constitutionalism". This paper will revisit and discuss this issue in the context of the Kyrgyz Republic. Main argument and thesis of the paper is following: Where a viable balance of power exists, a constitutional court acquires importance as a key element of that order, thus promoting the constitutionalism. If no such balance exists, the constitutional court will soon become a tool of the more dominant powers and thus lose its relevance for a genuine constitutional order.
mere understanding of basic phenomenon of constitutional courts is now being deeply rooted in the notion of constitutionalism. As Ran Hirschl emphasized "sweeping worldwide convergence to constitutionalism … entails far more than a mere adherence to majority rule". 11 Due to shifting nature of constitutionalism, the democracy is no longer understood as "canonical" majority rule/ parliamentary sovereignty, but rather as "minorities possess legal protection in the form of a written constitution, which even a democratically elected assembly cannot change". 12 It still remains unclear what does constitutionalism mean? Are there any criteria or definition against which the global constitutionalism can be tested? Overall there is no strictly defined definition or understanding of constitutionalism. According to Andras Sajo "constitutionalism is closely linked to traditional nineteenth century liberalism, which always escaped textbook definitions and resisted positive description". 13 However, existing scholarly literature in the field of constitutionalism share common traits that constitutionalism is a set of principles, ideals and values revolving around the organizational structure of government. 14 Reviewing the works of scholars as Andras Sajo, Giovanni Sartori, Michel Rosenfeld and Louis Henkin one can blueprint such principles of limited nature of government, respect for individual rights and rule of law as core values associated with constitutionalism. 15 One may ask what the limited government means. The primary understanding of limited government lays on written nature of constitution. As Chief Justice Marshal emphasized in Marbury vs. Madison, the entire purpose of writing the US constitution was to limit the government, not to empower it. 16 Existing scholarly literature in deliberative democracy highlights basic role of judicial review as a complementary tool in 11 Ibid., 2. 12 Ibid., 2. 13 Andras Sajo, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Central European University Press, 1999) . 9-13. 14 Cass R. Sunstein, "Constitutionalism after the new deal," Harvard Law Review 101, no. 2 (December 1987): 421-423 ; Bruce Akerman, "The Rise of World Constitutionalism," Virginia Law Review 83, no. 4 (1997) : 788-791. 15 Andras Sajo, Limiting Government, [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] ensuring the limited nature of government. 17 Application of basic principles revolving around the constitutionalism into third wave democracies, namely African/Asian and Former Soviet Union countries produces an interesting paradox. Namely, range of constitutions "without constitutionalism" 18 and "sham constitutions". 19 As Mazmanyan highlighted the constitutionalism in former Soviet Union States "has failed to meet the definition in several ways, but most importantly in that it continuously lacked sensitivity to the most essential aspect limit on government." 20
II. DISCUSSION

Hardships Faced by FSU Courts: from Shut Down to Major Institutional
Reconfiguration
At the end of the twentieth century, along with precipitous collapse of communist regimes across the East and Central Europe, culminating in the disappearance of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, the broad transformational trend toward democratization included dutiful processes of constitution-making and, as part of it, establishment of constitutional courts. These newly emerging democracies became active producers of constitutional courts 21 and late 1980's turned into the period of "the great constitutional borrowings." 22
17
After the collapse of the Soviet Union majority of states were functioning through introducing amendments to previous Soviet Constitutions. It generally took from 2 up to 4 years for different states to establish constitutional courts.
However, by the time of the establishment and in the process of negotiations the courts were already disciplined through reforms and major court shut downs.
This could be illustrated in the example of Russian Constitutional Court, since this particular state was the first signal upon what the entire region followed a certain constitutional pattern-namely the wave of constitutional court suspensions. 23 By the time of the final adoption of the constitution President Yeltsin was able to firmly concentrate power and furthermore to make sure that the most sympathetic draft would go into the referendum. 24 The constitution drafting of the first Constitution of RF was a back and force rival between president and parliament. The question about legitimacy of the court was not discussed whatsoever. However, after the popular support in referendum Eltsin gained confidence and called for a Constitutional Assembly to draft a new constitution. The draft constitution that the assembly was working was based on presidential draft however yet incorporated many elements of parliamentary draft as well. 25 But the Supreme Soviet refused to ratify it, because "accepting the documents that resulted from a presidential initiative was, therefore, tantamount to a surrender." 26 President Eltsin issued an edict suspending the work of the legislature and existing RSFSR constitution. Supreme Soviet and Constitutional Chamber had emergency meeting both of them condemned the actions of president however both the media and army was controlled by president. He used his authority blockaded the white house and arrested certain members of the Supreme Soviet. As a result of it the constitutional court was suspended. 27 Referendum was called and the constitution was adopted in December 1993. What is even more paradoxical is that the courts in this region is being empowered more and more. Alexei Trochev in his book "Judging Russia" presents 28 Wojciech Sadurski, Rights before courts. 29 an interesting observation on evolving nature of the constitutional review power in Russian Federation. His major concern is why the power of Russian Constitutional Court strengthens while the "Russian democracy weakens". 32 His comprehensive research suggests that it has been done on purpose, namely the empowerment of the judiciary in Russia was not based on good will of the politicians, rather it was a product of their hidden motives driven by their own self-interest and The constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic has been revised 8 times in the last 25 years. Then-President Akayev, between the years of 1994 and 2003, with the help of the referendum, introduced four of these eight amendments. Below is a brief description of these amendments:
Kyrgyz Constitutional Court and Constant Change of Roles: From Loyal
Agent of the President to the Agent of Neutrality
• The Constitution of Independent Kyrgyzstan was adopted in 1993 34 .
• In October 1994, as the result of a referendum, the "Jogorku Kenesh"
Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic was divided into two chambers.
• In February 1996, President Akayev called for another referendum, which resulted in a substantial increase of presidential powers under the new text of the Constitution. If the core of the 1993 Constitution was the principle of separation of powers, it was shifted to the principle of "supremacy of people", which according to the 1996 revisions, was expressed and guaranteed by the President.
• In October 1998, another referendum took place in the Kyrgyz Republic that introduced private property rights over lands for the citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic and recalculated deputy seats in both chambers of parliament.
Finally, new revisions of the constitution took away the inviolability of MPs of the parliament that were guaranteed by the previous constitution. • 2006: under the pressure of the opposition the compromised constitution was adopted between Bakiev and the opposition that have decreased Presidential powers that were highly extended by Akaev.
• 2007 Bakiev used the referendum to amend the constitution that pretty much brought back the 2003 version of it. Another heatedly debated decision of the court was on presidential elections. On July 13, 1998 constitutional court of the KR allowed 36 President
Akaev to be re-elected for 3rd term claiming that his first presidential term (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) Another decision of the Kyrgyz CC that has been reached shortly after the previous one during the politically fragmented and uncertain times also greatly contributes to the main hypothesis. The same year after the new constitution was adopted by a mean of referendum first party-based parliamentary elections took place. As a result of the elections pro-Bakiev political party gained the majority vote. By the decision of the Central Election Commission opposition party was excluded from gaining seats in the Parliament. This was done by strict application of 5% threshold. However, constitutional court overruled the decision of the Commission and one of the strongest opposition parties were allowed to gain seats in the parliament. 38 underlining basis for overview of the current constitution. In the classical parliamentary system, the president is elected not by people but by parliament.
The current Constitution of the KR preserved both an elected President and Parliament. However, the powers of president have been reduced, but not eliminated. Due to the fact that this is a new constitutional design for Kyrgyzstan, and due to the collegial nature of the parliament and lack of strongly established political parties, this was a good solution to counter-balance Parliament with elected President.
The unlikely governmental toppling, the 'second revolution' of April 2010, materializing to the surprise of the by-then very confident regime of Bakiyev, resulted in a severe political vacuum. Overnight, there was no president, no prime minister and cabinet, no parliament, and soon enough, not even the constitutional court. As the legitimating instrument of Bakiyev's rule, even the constitution could not be held up as any basis of authority. But even more than the collapse of nearly the entire institutional system of government, it was the relatively level field of victorious revolutionaries, about a dozen politicians, that provided for the atmosphere of indeterminacy and anarchy at the time. Taught by the bitter lesson of post-March 2005 developments, when the granting of authority to one person soon resulted in complete dominance of that person, the key political leaders in 2010 resisted any such authorization of one of them. The resulting Provisional Government 41 was a group of fourteen seasoned politicians, each with supreme ambitions, each commanding significant financial and political support of their own, each with a team of power-and reward-hungry functionaries and clients behind them. If Kyrgyzstan had ever been looking for a balance of powers, that fortuitous period was its best situation of balance.
What that balance lacked, obviously, was any legitimate and legal basis of power, except the unconvincing rhetoric about popular revolutionary mandate and the even less convincing "dressing" of all decisions by decrees. Due to the fact that this is a new constitutional design for Kyrgyzstan, due to collegial nature of the parliament and lack of strongly established political parties, this was a good solution to counter-balance Parliament with elected President.
As a result of 2010 events Constitutional Court of the KR was dismissed and replaced by a Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, which started functioning since 2013. One of the key differences of 2010 constitution with all other previous texts of the constitution is in the introduction of "parliamentarism".
This will be the underlining basis for overview of the current constitution.
Usually in classical parliamentary system president is elected not by people but Thus, producing a "constitution without constitutionalism". This further led to the 2016 constitutional amendments and substantial weakening of the work of the Constitutional Chamber and furthermore the weakening of the viable balance of power.
III. CONCLUSION
Application of basic principles revolving around the constitutionalism into third wave democracies, produced such phenomenon as constitutions "without constitutionalism". This paper revisited and discussed this issue in the context of the Kyrgyz Republic. Main argument and thesis of the paper was following:
Where a viable balance of power exists, a constitutional court acquires importance as a key element of that order, thus promoting the constitutionalism. If no such balance exists, the constitutional court will soon become a tool of the more dominant powers and thus lose its relevance for a genuine constitutional order.
The abovementioned thesis was demonstrated by the example of the Kyrgyz
Republic. It first provided a proper foundation and basic understanding of constitutionalism, further revisited this concept in the context of Former Soviet
Union and finally discussed the development of constitutionalism in Kyrgyzstan along with challenges faced by the constitutional review mechanism.
Thus, primary challenges for Kyrgyzstan for constitutional implementation predominantly were the failure to establish the state based on Constitutionalism.
Thus, producing a "constitution without constitutionalism". This further led to the 2016 constitutional amendments and substantial weakening of the work of the Constitutional Chamber and furthermore the weakening of the viable balance of power.
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